Friends, Enemies and Speech
Debates in the 1970s asked whether freedom of speech
was instrumental or an end in itself.

Both sides seemed to

desire to codify the 1960s, and those seeing speech as an
end believed that was the way to make it most secure.

I

thought they lost the intellectual battle then and it has
become increasingly clear they lost the political battle
over the subsequent years.

People believe in free speech

for instrumental reasons – it is deemed to help them and
their friends.
For most of the twentieth century liberals and their
allies had plenty to say and often needed the protections
of freedom of speech.

Then, commencing in the 1970s,

conservatives found the protections of free speech
increasingly valuable, while by the 1990s liberals had lost
their voice and therefore the need to protect speech.

The overarching theme of early twentieth century
progressivism was the need to constrain the individual.
Government and social reformers wanted to create a “new
American,” one who would accept social control for his or
her own betterment.

Thus as Mark Graber and David Rabban

have detailed, progressives had little use for freedom of
speech.

Once America entered the Great War, progressives
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in control of government instituted programs to suppress
any dissent.

They were successful in limiting dissent and,

of course, prevailing judicially.

Decisions from Schenck

to Whitney reflected the progressives’ values even as
support for them eroded in the post-war climate.
With the Great Depression, freedom of expression found
a substantial following for several reasons.

First, the

New Deal liberals remained progressives only in the belief
that government could run the economy; the disdain for
individualism was jettisoned without regret.

Second, the

prime target of local authorities were labor organizers and
labor was a key New Deal constituency, with New Dealers
believing it was essential that unions flourish.

To do so

they needed protection for organizing and free speech
protection was a necessary corollary.

Third, communists

were important labor organizers in the CIO and with the
Popular Front they represented (or at least appeared to
represent) the New Deal left.

A stock attack on the New

Deal from the right suggested that it was too close to
communism.

Thus not only were communists friends of New

Dealers, but their enemies were common enemies.

Since the

enemies wished to silence communists, New Dealers moved to
protect them.

Finally, Justices Holmes and Brandeis were

icons for the New Dealers.

There was a belief that the two
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could do no constitutional wrong.

Their opinions in

Abrams, Gitlow and Whitney were acclaimed not only for
their rhetoric, but also as exact guides to the meaning of
free speech.
The pattern was repeated in the 1950s with civil
rights and obscenity.

Northern Democrats fully supported

the efforts, whether individual, legislative, or judicial,
to abolish Jim Crow.

It was a no-brainer to believe that

most of the efforts of the civil rights movement deserved
constitutional protection.
Obscenity had parallels with the protection of
communism.

At the inception, obscenity was about artistic

self-expression.

Classics like Lady Chatterly’s Lover or

avant garde books like the bohemian Henry Miller’s Tropic
novels needed judicial protection.

Furthermore, those

pushing for censorship were reactionaries in the Catholic
Church, protestant ministers from the non-mainstream
demominations, and those on movie censorship board and
vice-squads (often the same).

The censors often seemed out

of control, the artistic community was solidly opposed, and
the supporters of censorship were not allies of liberals.
Again, support for artistic freedom was a no-brainer.
The dominant First Amendment question of the 1960s was
how to create the most speech-protective Constitutional
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doctrine and the leading scholars of the era, Harry Kalven
and Thomas Emerson offered different approaches.
favored Alexander Meiklejohn’s absolutism.

Kalven

The Court had

hinted at this in New York Times v. Sullivan, and the
theory offered a plus of getting out of the business of
trying to define obscenity.

Emerson favored a

speech/action distinction, but like others who flirted with
that approach, could not explain why some speech was action
while some action was speech.

There was a third

possibility, reviving the clear and present danger test
from its judicial and intellectual demise in Dennis.
Surprsingly something like a new and improved clear and
present danger test emerged out of the blue in Brandenburg.
At the end of the 1960s it looked like speech was very
well protected and that the scholarly enterprise had
succeeded.

At that point scholars asked what had largely

been unasked by their predecessors:
we) protect speech so well?”

“why do we (or should

Efforts to offer a unitary

theory of speech all demonstrated that some speech would
necessarily be unprotected, but the two dominant
approaches, promoting democracy and individual autonomy,
each found champions.
two fateful decisions.

Then into this mix the Court made
First, it decided that commercial

speech was entitled to (some) constitutional protection
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over Justice Rehnquist’s prescient solo dissent.

Second,

in Buckley v. Valeo, it refused to sustain all of the postWatergate campaign finance reforms.

Specifically it

concluded that candidates’ expenditures (typically for
advertising) could not be regulated.

The commercial speech

cases received immediate notice because it was clear that
protecting commercial speech had nothing to do with either
of the two dominant theories of the First Amendment.

At

least in retrospect (because it is deemed by many on the
liberal side to be so wrong) it is stunning that Buckley v.
Valeo received virtually no attention in the legal
literature for a decade.
The consequences of Virginia Pharmacy showed in the
early 1980s.

Being able to advertise, more or less freely,

offered a back door route to partial deregulation in some
industries.

Whether this was advisable or not, liberals

had two reasons to be uneasy.

First, this looked

uncomfortably close to Lochnerism.

Second, liberals like

regulation (certainly much more than conservatives) and so
the commercial speech doctrine worked in some instances
against their interests.

It was one thing to help lower

income people with drug price information or to learn that
personal injury lawyers offer contingent fees, it was quite
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another to see a utility company attempting to influence
electric consumption.
Most liberals – the ACLU was a notable exception –
supported campaign finance regulation.

They agreed that

there was too much money being spent on political campaigns
(without having to specify and justify a correct amount).
In a world where everyone’s vote counts equally it seemed
unfair that the wealthy should be able to wield so much
influence over how someone voted.

There was a nostalgia

for the pre-television era where supposedly voters would be
better informed since they would not be inundated with 30
second ads.

And then, of course, there was the brute

political assumption that the New Deal hegemony was only
broken by excessive money flowing into Republican
presidential campaigns.

If cash could be limited, then

volunteers would again take precedence in political
campaigns.

Volunteers came from three different groups:

organized labor, geezers in retirement, and college
students.

Happily each group was safely within the

Democratic constituencies.

The more campaign finance could

be regulated the harder it would be for Republicans to
maintain their unnatural claim on the presidency.

For the

first Schmooze Mark Tushnet put together a set of assumed
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correct propositions and one of them was Buckley v. Valeo
was wrongly decided.
Buckley and the commercial speech cases led to a topdown critique of emerging First Amendment doctrine at a
time when the older issues of illegal advocacy, union
organizing, and obscenity had seemed to pass from the
jurisprudential domain. Then came a different assault on
sexual materials, not from the pulpits, but instead from
one wing of feminism.

Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea

Dworkin were able to persuade the Minneapolis City Council
to adopt an ordinance banning “pornography” which had
several definitions the key one of which was male dominance
in any depiction of sex.

They claimed that the subordinate

role of women in American society was caused by
pornography.

In so doing they attempted to restructure the

law of sex by switching from the moral harm rationale of
Paris Adult to the assertion that pornography victimized
women, both specifically and generally.
Minneapolis’ Democratic mayor vetoed the ordinance on
the ground that it was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.

In what would be a telling move for liberals,

Larry Tribe wrote the mayor protesting his actions and
claiming that any decision on the ordinance should be made
by the courts.

Tribe’s position was perfectly justifiable;
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it just happened to be inconsistent with the views he
offered in his recently published American Constitutional
Law. He followed his allies, not his treatise.
A few years later Tribe got his judicial decision
although it probably was not the one he desired (and
definitely was not what Frank Michleman wanted).

A three

judge district court found that the MacKinnon-Dworkin
ordinance was an attempt at thought control.

The Big Court

summarily affirmed and for all practical purposes the legal
issue was over.

The Warren and Burger Court free speech

precedents successfully blocked what some feminists seemed
to think was essential legislation.
twice:

Women were victimized

once by pornography and once by what formerly was

liberal constitutional doctrine.

Nevertheless, the outcome

was to move liberals into an equivalence with conservatives
to demonize sexually explicit depictions (which remain
unloved except in the marketplace).
As campus debates on race became “uninhibited, robust,
and wide open” and included “vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on” university
policies relating to affirmative action, the ideas behind
the feminist proposal were adopted and adapted in campus
speech codes.

Typically overbroad, the codes were hated by

conservative faculty members who perceived them as vehicles
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to prevent questioning of “politically correct” ideas on
race, feminism, and gays.

Indeed, in the wake of the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Hopwood (forbidding the University of
Texas from using race in admissions), my colleague Lino
Graglia gave one of his typical
upon race.

over-the-top statements

He claimed that the reason there were so few

minorities ready for UT was that their cultures did not
place emphasis on academic success and indeed frowned up
it.

I have read a similar statement by Jesse Jackson, but

Graglia is not perceived as a friend to minorities and UT’s
president wanted to use UT’s speech code to sanction him.
(Our general counsel then pronounced the code
unconstitutional).

It was plain during the controversy

that conservatives were supporting Graglia’s right to speak
and liberals were ambivalent (because race was trumping
speech).
In 1986 Lee Bollinger published The Tolerant Society
an essay claiming that we properly protect speech we hate
because this offers one sphere to teach the importance and
practice of tolerance.
society.

Doing so strengthens us as a

Apparently tolerance of speech stopped at the

boundaries of the University of Michigan because to the
best of my knowledge Bollinger never publicly questioned
his university’s unconstitutional speech code.
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Protests at abortion clinics provide the another area
where liberals and conservatives have split on speech.

Too

often protesters would go to extreme lengths to harass
women going to the clinics.

This was countered by

injunctions creating space for the women to enter the
clinic without confrontation.

Since protests often need

proximity to the object of protest – see Adderley – the
injunctions were not speech friendly.

I heard no liberal

outcry, undoubtedly because the constitutional right to an
abortion trumped the speech claims.

Liberals did react

adversely to Rust v. Sullivan, however, but that was
because both speech and abortion got trumped.
In the 1980s the religious right and the Republican
platform began to attack Establishment Clause doctrine from
a free exercise perspective.

What secularists would call

an appropriate barrier, Republicans labeled a denial of
free exercise.

Republicans scored some victories in

cutting back on establishment doctrine, but not with their
free exercise claims.

Then in Rosenberger the religious

right repackaged their claim once again, this time as a
free speech issue. Liberals were dismissive of the idea and
then stunned by the outcome which ordered, for the first
time, actual funding of religious speech.

On all the prior

issues there are splits within the liberal camp – thanks to
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the ACLU.

But on religious speech liberals are united in

their belief that separation is essential (and that the
religious right is an unmitigated menace).

There is no

comparable way that liberals could enjoy the benefits of
this new avenue, and perhaps Rosenberg was the proverbial
straw that broke the camel’s back.
One further item merits mention.
ideas.

Liberals ran out of

Essentially liberalism of the 1990s consisted of a

desire to expand some New Deal-Great Society programs, but
that was it.

Indeed, when faced with Republican Congresses

liberalism was reduced to the demand that no New Deal-Great
Society program should ever see its rate of growth slowed.
When one is out of ideas there is not much pleasant to talk
about.

The concept of strong protections of speech seems

patently absurd when nothing one could say matters and the
other side is monopolizing debate.

To no small extent the

liberal unease at the First Amendment is fueled by the
intellectual atrophy of the liberal agenda.
Could it swing back to where it was in the 1960s?
Perhaps.

There are three possibilities – the anti-

globalization movement, the war on terror, and intellectual
property imperialism.

The antiglobalization movement has

plenty to say about free and fair trade, and the protesters
are going to have a very bad relationship with police
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forces in any city holding globalization meetings.

The

same principles that harm protesters at abortion clinics
can harm antiglobalization protesters.

It should receive

an increasingly sympathetic ear on the left especially if
the Democratic Party moves into a protectionist mode.
Nevertheless, if forced to choose between abortion and
anything else, liberals are likely to go with the former.
Whether the war on terror will help is more iffy –
although there is a visceral reaction against anything John
Ashcroft says or does.

If he would come out against

freedom of speech, liberals would see something good again
in the First Amendment as the reaction to the subpoenas at
Drake illustrated.

So far the only place where Ashcroft is

on the record against speech comes in the various
pornography areas, and I may have missed something, but I
saw no objections from the left.

The feminist movement may

have so thoroughly convinced their allies that even John
Ashcroft’s imprimatur on a crusade won’t damage it here.
Thus the typical reaction to his efforts to stop porn are
complaints that he didn’t have his war on terrorism
priorities straight when they could have helped.
On the other hand, when Ashcroft does have them
straight, he has run into a lot of criticism for abandoning
the constitution and civil liberties.
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So far these seem

strongest on privacy grounds.

Should this swing into

association, I could conceive a tugging of the civil
liberties heartstrings.

Still, this has a wild “the enemy

of my enemy is my friend” quality since both Ashcroft and
Islamists are way off on the right.

On the other hand, all

prior crusades against an enemy within have crossed the
civil liberties barriers all too quickly.
I think intellectual property imperialism is the most
likely to cause liberals to understand that free speech can
be a good thing.

Despite Chris Eisgruber’s contribution,

it does seem to me that there has been extraordinary
overreaching on the part of copyright holders and the ongoing battles seem to have a David and Goliath quality
about them, sadly with Goliath prevailing.

With the wrong

side winning and free speech as the only weapon against it,
perhaps this will turn liberals once again to love freedom
of speech.
When McConnell v. FEC came down the Law & Courts list
serve enjoyed a little fun at the expense of the
attitudinalists.
characterized?

How should the decision and the split be

The answer is rather simple.

When the

supporters of the law are mainly liberal, the opponents
mainly conservative and the more reliably liberal justices
vote for the law and the most reliably conservative vote
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against it, then the decision is a liberal decision.

It

also further illustrates, as I have been suggesting, that
the old liberal-conservative breakdown on free speech is a
thing of the past.

New issues and new participants have

flipped the positions.

Only the ACLU across the board and

the conservatives on sex have not gotten the message.
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